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There is one similarity between declining and
developing countries and that is the level of
militarisation, that is to say the size of military
expenditure in relation to total resources. As a
share of GNP, developing countries spend around
6 per cent on armaments, NATO European
countries excluding Britain spend around 3+ per
cent, while Britain spends around 5 per cent on
armaments1. It seems that only the most advanced
fast-growing capitalist nations can do without
high military spending, such as mid-nineteenth
century Britain, America before World War II
and modern Japan. But there the resemblance
ends. The functions of militarisation in declining
and developing countries, in what one might call
underdeveloped and overdeveloped countries, are
altogether different.
There are two main characteristics of the arma-
ments sector in developing countries. The first is
that of dependence. Third World countries
import most of their arms and even those that
are attempting to develop an indigenous arms
industry, such as Egypt, Iran, Brazil or India, are
heavily dependent on foreign technology, foreign
capital equipment, components and materials, and
foreign specialists2. They also import military
advice and military training-in effect, a total
1 Based on 1975 figures (US ACDA, 1976). Even this state-
ment needs qualification. There are wide differences between
the poorest agricultural economies, like much of Africa and
Central America, which spend little on armaments, and the
more advanced industrialising countries like Brazil, Egypt,
India or the oil-rich Middle Eastern States.
2 Since World War II, ca-German scientists and technicians
have played an important role in the establishment of anna
industries in several Third World countries.
miltary structure, generally based on a Western
model.
The second characteristic of the armament sector
in Third World countries is its role in the
mobilisation of resources. Evidently, the arma-
ments sector in Third World countries absorbs
resources which could, a priori, be better used for
non-military purposes. But also, the armaments
sector plays a key role in drawing peripheral
economies into the international system, in shift-
ing the pattern of development to meet global
requirements, in imposing a world division of
labour. According to one school of thought, this
is the consequence of the 'modernising' role of
the army. On account of its Western ways, the
armaments sector can promote growth by creating
infrastructure-roads, bridges, etc., stimulating
industrial demand, and inducing 'modern' skills
and attitudes, etc. (See, for example, Pye 1962,
Benoit 1973). But there is also a much more
significant aspect of the armaments sector. This
is the role of the military as an organised force
and as an instrument of repression. It can be
argued that Western-type armies are inclined to
use that power in order to assert Western-style
'development', that is to say, to impose a social
and political structure which can generate a
sufficient surplus for Western-type industrialisa-
tion, in which the distribution of income is such
Table 1-Resources Devoted to Research and Development as a Share of GNP, 1967 and 1971
Sources: Patterns of Resources Devoted to Research and Experimental Development in the OECD Area, 1963-1971, OECD,




as to transfer resources from consumption to
investment and from countryside to town. (See
U. Albrecht et al 1976, Kaldor 1976). This is
3 As in the case of certain industrial 'latecomers', e.g. MciiiJapan or Tsarist Russia, where the military were used for











United States 3. 1.1 2.0 34.1 2.5 0.7 1.8 38.8
United Kingdom 2.4 0.6 1.8 24.3 2.3 0.5 1.8 27.8
France 2.3 0.5 1.8 23.5 1.8 0.3 1.5 19.4
West Germany 2.0 0.2 1.8 10.7 2.1 0.1 2.0 5.0
Netherlands 2. 1 - 2.1 1.9 2.0 - 2.0 1.9
Switzerland 1 .8 1.8 2.2 2.0 2.0
Japan 1.8 - 1.8 1.1 1.6 - 1.6 0.6
Sweden 1.8 0.4 1.4 24.9 1.6 0.2 1.4 14.3
India 0.4 0.4 10.5
not to say that high military spending brings
about development, in the sense of raising
standards of living and laying the basis for future
expansion. Precisely because the armaments sector
is a dependent sector, organised force cannot be
used to protect indigenous industrialisation3.
Standards of living remain low and even in some
cases decline. The armaments sector does bring
about change, in the sense of increased
dependence and 'Westernisation' or 'modernisa-
tion' of a small privileged sector, but this does
not, of course, mean progress.
in Britain, in contrast, the armaments sector is
indigenous and traditionalising. Britain is the
second most science-intensive economy in the
West, measured by the share of GNP devoted to
R & D expenditure. But a rather large proportion
of scientific and technical resources is engaged in
military work and related projects like Concorde
or nuclear energy. This is shown in Table 1 which
includes the eight top R & D spenders in OECD
countries together with India, the only developing
country for which information about civil and
military R & D is readily available. It is worth
noting that the science intensity of the Indian
economy was several orders of magnitude lower
than that of developed countries, including
Britain. The heavy concentration of scientific and
technical talent in the British armament sector
has resulted in the development of important new
military technologies: for example, the new
Table 2-Arms Trade as a Share of Total Trade for Selected Countries and Regions, 1974, million, current prices
36
Rapier surface to air missile which can pursue
low flying aircraft through microwaves; the new
plastic reinforced Chobham armour for tanks;
the Harrier vertical Take-off and Landing fighter
aircraft, and various fast missile firing patrol
boats. Britain is the fourth largest arms exporter
in the world after the United States, the Soviet
Union and France, and in some categories of
armaments, for example, warships, it is the
world's leading exporter. Britain's dependence on
imports is low compared with other developed
countries like Germany or Switzerland, let alone
with developing countries. Table 2 shows the
contrast in the pattern of world arms trade
between Britain and the developed countries, on
the one hand, and developing countries, on the
other. The table includes some of the more
industrialised developing countries since these
might be considered more appropriate for
comparison with Britain.
The resource absorbing effect of this highly
developed indigenous armaments sector seems to
be more important than the resource mobilising
effect. Table 1 shows that the civilian science
intensity of Germany, the Netherlands and
Switzerland had overtaken Britain and the United
States by 1971. Since the war, civilian innovation
in Britain has consistently lagged behind civilian
innovation in other developed countries. New
ideas, known as 'spin-off', do result from the
heavy concentration of resources-the highly
Notes: 1 Arms exports figures are taken from official sources.
2 Excludes China and Japan and Taiwan.
3 Excludes petroleum.
- negligible.
Sources: United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Tran.sfers 1966-75,
Washington DC, 1976, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistical Yearbook 1975, New
York, 1976; UK House of Commons Official Report of Debates ([fausard), 10 March, 1977, written answers to questions;
France, Assemblee Nationale, session 1975-76, Commission des Finances, Rapport no. 1916 annexe no. 49, Défense.
Arms Exports Total Exports Arms Total % Arms Imports Total Imports Arms Total %
United States 4160 97,144 4.3 116 107,112 0.1
United Kingdom t 1070 38,639 2.8 73 54,142 0.1
France! 1390 45,852 3.0 23 52,992
West Germany 223 90,590 0.2 470 70,241 0.7
Netherlands 18 32,810 0.! 33 32,629 0.1
Switzerland 23 11,788 0.2 38 14,421 0.3
Japan 10 55,536 91 62,110 0.1
Sweden 37 15,937 0.2 16 16,455 0.1
Latin America o 51,270 408 52,820 0.8
Africa 2 37,444 382 25,092 1.5
Middle East 80 97,566 0.1 3050 25,378 12.0
{4,3303J
Asia2 3 45,670 1756 52,960 3.3
Brazil o 7,952 71 14,168 0.5
Egypt 4 1,516 0.3 118 23,48 5.0
Israel 22 1,734 1.3 636 41,79 15.2













successful McClaren Baby Buggy is one
example. But, in general, the economic condition
of civilian industry combined with the profit-
ability of military innovation has inhibited their
development4.
Table 3-Investment and Military Expenditure, Western Countries, 1974
United States 85900 6.15 18 3.9
United Kingdom 10100 5.24 20 2.7
France 10600 3.63 25 5.7
West Germany 13800 3.58 22 4.7
Netherlands 2320 3.45 22 5.4
Sweden 1780 3.10 22 3.4
Norway 671 3.13 32 4.7
Italy 4630 2.93 23 4.8
Belgium 1460 2.77 22 4.8
Denmark 728 2.37 22 4.5
Canada 2790 2.05 23 5.2
Switzerland 856 1.91 27 4.0
New Zealand 237 1.75 26 3.4
Finland 255 1.31 29 4.9
Austria 292 0.91 28 5.2
Luxembourg 18 0.87 26 3.4
Japan 3670 0.83 34 10.5
Sources:
a US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms TransJèrs 1965-1974 Washington
DC. US Government Printing Office (1976)
b United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Statistical Office, Statistical Yearbook, 1975 New York,
United Nations (1976)
c US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1963-1973 Washington
DC, US Government Printing Office (1974)
More important than the absorption of scientific between military spending, investment and growth
and technical resources, perhaps, have been the might combine these explanations. My own view
overall resource absorbing consequences. Table 3 is that military spending can be viewed as a
shows a clear inverse correlation between military dynamic element in a process of decline, repre-
spending and domestic investment among Western senting a Government response to decline-to
developed countries. The correlation has also been unemployment or to threatened bankruptcy, which
shown to hold over time in Britain (Smith 1977). generates an internal momentum, which in turn
(There is no observable similar relationship for absorbs resources which might otherwise have
developing countries: if anything, as implied contributed to investment and economic growth
above, military spending and investment may be (Kaldor, 1977). Military spending does keep less
positively correlated.) The direction of causation profitable industries alive; in Britain, it accounts
has not been firmly established. Some argue that for 20 per cent of mechanical engineering output,
high military spending is a response to slow half of shipbuilding output and three quarters of
economic growth and low investment; others that aerospace output (UK Central Statistical Office,
it is the cause. Among the second group, some 1975). In developing countries, this might be
attribute the relationship to the stability of considered beneficial because the industries in
consumption and welfare, to a socially determined question have a future potential-the infant
"social wage" (Smith 1977). And others hold that industries' argument. But in Britain, these are
military spending induces short-term bottlenecks industries which have passed their prime and
in important export and capital intensive sectors, whose existence inhibits the development of new
for example, machinery and transportation, which dynamic sectors-in other words the senile
have serious long-term consequences for the industries' argument. It can be argued, therefore,
4 It is interesting to note that automobile manufacture was a
'spin-off' from the military Sector. In 1906, Armstrong had
a pian to mass produce 6,000 cars which was rejected by
the Directors on the grounds that "the profit on 6,000 cars
was inferior to that on a single river gunboat". (Trebilcock,
1969.)
economy (Rothschild, 1973). It is widely con-
sidered that military priorities in the shipbuilding
and engineering industries during the early 1950s
lost Britain an important place in the world
market. A plausible account of the relationship
that military spending in Britain postpones
economic crisis and collapse but it also prevents
change.
The contrast between military and civilian spheres
is reflected in international military relationships
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Country Military expenditure a Military Expenditure Investment as A verage annual gro vt/i
(US x 106) as percentage of GNP" percentage of GDP h rate in GNP 1963-73,
per cent C
among advanced industrial nations. Britain is, of
course, a member of NATO, and 90 per cent of
the British military budget represents NATO
costs (compared with 60 per cent for the United
States, excluding extra-European NATO costs).
Membership in NATO could be said to represent
membership in a developed countries' club and to
signify a commitment to the liberal world
economy; in that sense, as for other developed
European nations, it involves a kind of depend-
ence. But it is worth noting that by the criteria
of military power accepted within NATO, Britain
is the second strongest nation after the United
States and has retained a relatively independent
role, particularly for the navy. Indeed, it is
stressed by both British and American leaders,
though probably quite wrongly, that military
power, and particularly the presence of troops in
Germany, is an important bargaining counter in
negotiations about economic and political matters.
This apparently privileged position is, however,
threatened. The co-existence of a highly advanced
miilitary sector and a decaying civilian economy
cannot be sustained for ever. Indeed the situation
has already led to a series of economic and
military crises, to the paring of the armaments
sector. As the military sector becomes more
advanced it becomes at once more expensive and
difficult to finance. And as economic and political
divisions emerge among the Western countries,
there are increasing attempts to use the military
alliance system to suppress them; to establish a
structure of military dependence under NATO,
i.e. American, or European, i.e. German,
command. In effect, Britain is poised in two
directions. Scientific and technical talent can be
transferred abroad, to Germany or America, and
this is already happening to some extent. America
is developing the Harrier because Britain cannot
afford it; America and Germany have adopted
Chobham armour for their new tanks before
Britain; the Multi-Role Combat Aircraft and
other Anglo-German collaborative projects are
regarded in arms industry circles as a way of
developing the German arms industry to the
disadvantage of Britain. There are substantial
pressures, expressed in the NATO language as
'integration' and 'standardisation', to move
further in this direction. Britain would thus lose
its military independence, dissipate its own efforts,
and become more like a developing country.
The alternative is demilitarisationa positive
policy aimed at reversing the process of decline.
Unlike a developing country, Britain possesses in
its armaments sector an enormous reserve of skill
and talent which could be used for indigenous
civilian innovation, for redevelopment.
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Such redevelopment would not, of course, come
about automatically through reductions in military
spending. After all, military spending was a
consequence as much as a cause of the failure of
the civilian economy and the anarchy of industrial
organisation. It would have to be part of a wider
industrial strategy in which direct intervention in
the economy channelled investment into dynamic,
socially productive sectors. Awareness of the
crisis of the defence sector has already led to
initiatives by workers in arms companies such as
Lucas Aerospace, Rolls Royce, Vickers and BAC.
They have proposed alternative plans for invest-
ment in new areas, with a range of formidable
ideas for new transport systems on road, rail or
canal; energy systems based on renewable sources
of energy such as wind, waves, tides or direct
solar collection; medical systems like sight for the
blind using radar; as well as ideas for the process
of production in agriculture, mining and manu-
facturing (See Labour Party Defence Study
Group, 1977). If these ideas could be harnessed to
demilitarisation and new forms of industrialis-
ation, the tendencies towards under-development
could be powerfully reversed.
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